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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
CONTRACTS-CREDIT CARD LIABILITY RESULTING
FROM UNAUTHORIZED USE
Texaco, Inc., an oil company having dealers operating gas stations
throughout the United States, issued credit cards enabling the holders to
purchase its products at any authorized Texaco station. The face of the
card contains a signature block, and above that block, the words "Issued
subject to conditions on reverse side, Texaco, 'Inc." are inscribed. On the
reverse side of the card the agreement between the customer and the com-
pany is contained, and the relevant portion appears as follows:
whose name is embossed on the reverse side . . . assumes full responsibility
for all purchases made hereunder by anyone through the use of this credit
card prior to surrendering it to the company or to giving the company notice
in writing that the card has not been lost or stolen. Retention of this card or
use thereof constitutes acceptance of all the terms and conditions thereof.
Subsequently, defendant was deprived of the card by theft, but failed to
report the loss to plaintiff. A dealer marketing plaintiff's products picked
up the card at Chicago, Illinois, where it had been tendered by the thief.
The dealer notified the plaintiff, and plaintiff in turn notified defendant.
From the date the card was missing to the date of notification by plaintiff
to defendant, some $569.98 in charges were made with the credit card,
which charges constitute the subject of this action. The question presented
to the court was whether the defendant was liable pursuant to the terms
and conditions on the reverse side of the credit card, for unauthorized
purchases made by another, prior to notification to the plaintiff by the
defendant of the loss of the card. The Municipal Court of New York City
held defendant was liable, and that his liability arose out of the contract
contained on the card itself. Texaco v. Goldstein, 229 N.Y.S.2d 51 (Munic.
Ct. 1962).
The use of the "credit card" system in the United States today is very
common, yet the contractual relationship in this type of transaction in-
volves a relatively new area of law. Credit systems employing the use
of some type of token are divided into two classifications. The first is the
two-party agreement, whereby the issuer of the token deals directly with
the holder, thus creating a personal relationship. The second classification
is the three-party agreement, which finds the issuer dealing not only with
the holder, but also a third-party dealer who dispenses the issuer's mer-
chandise and then assigns to the issuer the debt of the holder, thus creating
an impersonal relationship. Only eight states have considered the "im-
poster" problem, and of these only six have dealt with the three-party
agreement. The earlier cases concerned two-party agreements.' In the
1 For a more detailed discussion of the difference between two and three-party agree-
ments see, Comment, The Tripartite Credit Card Transaction: A Legal Infant, 48 CALIF.
L. REv. 459 (1960).
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case of Wanamaker v. Megary,2 the defendant lost the credit "coin" which
had been issued by the plaintiff, and prior to notice being given to plain-
tiff, an imposter charged several purchases against defendant's account.
The "coin" contained no terms except to have defendant's account num-
ber imprinted on its face. The court likened the device to a negotiable
instrument, and pointed to defendant's negligence by saying "as between
two innocent parties, 'he who makes the loss possible should bear it.' ",3
Eight years later, in Lit Bros. v. Haines,4 the Supreme Court of New
Jersey was presented with substantially the same set of circumstances. It
refused to accept the coin as a negotiable instrument, and went on to hold
no contract in fact existed.5 The last of the two-party cases was Jones
Store Co. v. Kelly. 6 The issue of contract arose in connection with de-
fendant's objections to the instructions, i.e. that the court assumed a per-
fect contract of sale, but the Appellate Court held the instructions erro-
neous for reasons not assigned. The court went on to say the defendant
would be liable only for authorized purchases. 7 The significance of these
early cases is that they represented the only precedent available to the
courts in future three-party controversies. It is also interesting to note
that even though the contract relationships in the two types of problems
are basically different, the early two-party cases failed to deal with the
issue of contract directly as did the three-party cases later. The net result
of these first three cases were three separate and distinct approaches to the
placing of liability in two-party cases.
The evolution into the three-party agreement only seemed to aggravate
an existing problem. Where and how was liability to be placed? In the first
case, Gulf Refining Co. v. Plotnick,8 it was decided that in the absence of
an express contract, each party owed the other a duty of care. The court
said of the credit card that: "To carry into effect its intended use there
is an implied contract that it will be used or honored properly and with
due care." The court then denied the existence of a proper contract, and
resorted to a fiction of law to enforce the legal duties.
The contract problem seemed to be solved at last in Magnolia Petroleum
Co v. McMillan,'° when defendant was held bound to the terms on the
2 24 Pa. Dist. 778 (Munic. Ct., Phila. 1915).
31d. at 780. 4 98 N.J.L. 658, 121 Atl. 131 (1923).
5 The Supreme Court of New Jersey held no contract existed because of the absence
of terms on the coin, but went on to indicate that if the terms were proven by being
on the face of the coin defendant would have been liable. (Dictum) Id. at 661, 121 Atl.
at 132.
6225 Mo. App. 833, 36 S.W. 2d 681 (1931).
7 Id. at 836, 36 S.W. 2d at 683. 9 Id. at 150.
8 24 Pa. D. & C. 147 (1934). 10 168 S.W. 2d 881 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
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credit card. The case, however, was not decided on the contract issue
directly, but rather on the question of whether the unauthorized use was
a valid defense." Similarly, a very unique situation arose in Gulf Refining
Co. v. Williams Roofing Co.12 The defendant admitted he was bound by
the terms on the credit card, but in addition, he claimed that the plaintiff
was bound by the restrictive term he placed on the card after he received
it, even though plaintiff was unaware of the change. The case was com-
plicated by the fact that there was substantial evidence of "bad faith" on
the part of plaintiff's dealers, and also the fact that it was a suit in equity.
The result was that no question of legal significance was answered, and
plaintiff's suit was dismissed for want of equity.'
The most comprehensive analysis of the problem was undertaken in
Union Oil Co. v. Lull.14 Although the court devoted itself to deciding the
case on the lone term "guaranty,"' 15 it made two significant observations
as far as the question of a contract relationship was concerned. The first
was dictum, because the issue of contract was not properly raised in the
pleadings. The court said that if the question, whether or not the terms
on the credit card constituted part of the contract, was properly raised,
it would have been a question for the jury. The second observation merely
amounted to a citing of secondary authority in support of why the terms
should be binding.'8
The decisions, so far, reflect primarily two lines of reasoning for the
placing of liability, (1) the negligence of the parties involved, and (2) the
striking down of defenses not related directly to the contract issue, when
there is an assumption by the parties that the terms on the credit card are
11 Here defendant admitted liability if the purchases were authorized, but claimed
that he had a good defense because they were not. Compare, Jones Store Co. v. Kelly,
225 Mo. App. 833, 36 S.W. 2d 681 (1931). The Appellate Court reasoned that since
defendant admitted being bound to some of the terms he was bound by all the terms,
and since the terms expressly excluded his defense of unauthorized use he was liable.
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. McMillan, 168 S.W. 2d 881 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
12208 Ark. 362, 186 S.W. 2d 790 (1945).
13 The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that plaintiff's dealers were bound by the
restrictive term "For truck use only," and since plaintiff was an assignee of the dealers
he had no better rights than they had. Therefore, plaintiff took the assignment subject
to the defense of collusion or "bad faith." Id. at 367, 186 S.W. 2d at 794.
14220 Ore. 412, 349 P. 2d 243 (1960).
15 It was argued that the term "guaranty" made the defendant a gratuitous indemni-
tor, thus giving rise to a duty of mutual due care. The Supreme Court of Oregon
went on to place the burden of proving due care solely on the plaintiff. 220 Ore. 412,
349 P. 2d 243 (1960). The Court also expressed its approval of the "mutual due care"
doctrine that was stated in Gulf Refining Co. v. Plornck, 24 Pa. D. & C. 147 (1934).
16 The secondary authority concerned basic principles of contract law. See, 1 CoRBIN
S 67 (1950); 3 CORBIN § 607 (1950); RESTATEMENT, CoNTRAcTs Sec. 29, 52, 70, and 72 (1)
(a) (1932); 1 WILLISTON § 90A (3rd ed.).
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binding. The Texaco case finds its importance then, in that it deviates
from the above two precedent patterns.
The deviation from negligence was not so all encompassing in the
Texaco case. The Court covered the role of negligence in its discussion of
public policy and the importance of the credit card to the economy. In
short, since the plaintiff had no control over the dealer or the purchaser,
"the negligence of the card holder becomes most important."' 7 Converse-
ly, since the plaintiff did lack control and the fact that there were thirty
thousand dealers, it would be absurd to impose a standard of due care.
It is worth noting here that this latter discussion of the court did in effect
amount to negation of the need for negligence in order to place liability
in situations similar to this. The truth of the matter is that the absence or
presence of negligence in the conduct of the card holder has no effect on
his liability if he is bound by a formal and binding contract. This would
not be so if it were a question of an implied contract' s or a contract of
indemnity.19
Upon reviewing the decision in the Texaco case, the words of the court
are unmistakably clear as to whether a formal and binding contract ex-
isted. "The issuance of the card to the defendant amounted to a mere
offer on plaintiff's part, and the contract became entire when defendant
retained the card and thereafter made use of it. The card itself then con-
stituted a formal and binding contract. '20 A general principle of contract
law is that although an offeror has the power to specify the manner in
which his offer is to be accepted, 21 he does not possess the power to make
the offeree's silence operate as an acceptance merely because the terms of
the offer purport to attach that effect to it.2 2 But if the offeree makes one
credit purchase with the card, his behavior would indicate an acceptance. 28
This is what the Texaco case found, because there was not only retention
of the card but also the use of the card according to its intended purpose.
Also, one who manifests acceptance of the terms of a writing which can
be reasonably understood to be a contract is bound by the contract even
17 Texaco v. Goldstein, 229 N.Y.S. 2d 51, 55 (Munic. Ct. 1962).
Is Gulf Refining Co. v. Plotnick, 24 Pa. D. & C. 147 (1934).
19 Union Oil Co. v. Lull, 220 Ore. 412, 349 P. 2d 243 (1960). The Texaco case did not
reverse the Court's holding in the Lull case concerning a duty of mutual due care,
because it distinguished the two cases on the basis of the term "guaranty." Therefore,
negligence would be a basis for liability if a contract of indemnity could be found.
See discussion in note 15 supra.
20 Texaco v. Goldstein, 229 N.Y.S. 2d 51, 54 (Munic. Ct. 1962). (Emphasis added.)
21 1 Corbin Sec. 67 (1950); Restatement, Contract, Sec. 52 (1932).
2 2 RSTATEMENT, CONTRACTS Sec. 72 (1932).
23 RESTATEMENT, CoNTRACTs Sec. 72 (1) (a) (1932).
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though ignorant of the true meaning of those terms. 24 The facts of the
Texaco case and the Court's holding come directly within these principles,
thus finding justification for a formal and binding contract.
In conclusion, the court in holding that a formal and binding contract
existed, did so without any explicit reference to existing authority. Clearly,
previous decisions implied there was a contract, if only from an assump-
tion or an admittance on the part of the parties of its existence.2 5 Also,
the court cited the Lull case in its decision which gave full consideration
to basic principles of contract law.2 6 Finally, it was pointed out that the
Legislature of the State of New York took cognizance of the problem by
enacting section 512 of the General Business Law.2 7 It should be noted
here that there was a recent New York case dealing with a substantially
analogous situation, where the defendant received a restaurant credit card
subject to the terms on the reverse side. The Supreme Court of New York
held that since the defendant retained and used the card, he is charged
with notice of the terms on the reverse side. The court further stated that
his retention and use also amounted to a manifestation of assent to those
terms, thus constituting an acceptance and binding him to the conditions
of the contract. The Texaco case used the same reasoning in its decision,
and therefore inadvertently or otherwise placed itself in agreement with
the highest court of the State of New York.28
The Texaco case does seem to settle the question of how and where is
liability to be placed in factual situations such as this. A slight change in
the facts could and would probably vary the result. If the term "guaranty"
were incorporated into the contract, would the Lull holding of an implied
duty of care persist? If there was mere retention of the card without its
ever being used, could there be found a manifestation of assent to the
terms on the card? If the card was non-transferable without the term
"guaranty" included, would the courts return to imposing a duty of care?
These and many more questions will have to be settled before the liability
from issue of a credit card can be predicted with some degree of accuracy.
24 3 CORBIN, sec. 607 (1950); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS Sec. 70 (1932); 1 WLLISTON
Sec. 90A (3rd Ed.).
25 Assumption cases, see Wanamaker v. Megary, 24 Pa. Dist. 778 (Munic. Ct., Phila.
1915); Jones Store Co. v. Kelly, 225 Mo. App. 833, 36 S.W. 2d 681 (1931). Admittance
cases, see Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. McMillan, 168 S.W. 2d 881 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943);
Gulf Refining Co. v. Williams Roofing Co., 208 Ark. 362, 186 S.W. 2d 790 (1945).
26 See note 16 supra.
27 Section 512 provides: "to impose liability ... by the use of a credit card after its
loss or theft is effective only if it is conspicuously written or printed in a size at least
equal to eight point bold type either on the card or on a writing accompanying the
card.... ." NEW YORK GENERAL BUSINESS LAW Sec. 512.
28 Franklin National Bank v. Kass, 19 Misc. 2d 280, 184 N.Y.S. 2d 783 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
This case was not cited by the Court so it cannot be considered as really having any
influence on the Court's decision in the Texaco case.
